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Abstract—This paper studies interference exploitation tech-
niques for secure beamforming design in simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) in multiple-input
single-output (MISO) systems. In particular, multiuser interfer-
ence (MUI) and artificially generated noise signals are designed as
constructive to the information receivers (IRs) yet kept disruptive
to potential eavesdropping by the energy receivers (ERs). The
objective is to improve the received signal-to-interference and
noise ratio (SINR) at the IRs by exploiting the MUI and AN
power in an attempt to minimize the total transmit power. We
first propose second-order cone programming based solutions
for the perfect channel state information (CSI) case by defin-
ing strong upper and lower bounds on the energy harvesting
(EH) constraints. We then provide semidefinite programming
based solutions for the problems. In addition, we also solve
the worst-case harvested energy maximization problem under
the proposed bounds. Finally, robust beamforming approaches
based on the above are derived for the case of imperfect
CSI. Our results demonstrate that the proposed constructive
interference precoding schemes yield huge saving in transmit
power over conventional interference management schemes. Most
importantly, they show that, while the statistical constraints of
conventional approaches may lead to instantaneous SINR as well
as EH outages, the instantaneous constraints of our approaches
guarantee both constraints at every symbol period.
I. INTRODUCTION
Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) has attracted a huge upsurge of interest in recent
years due to its potential towards energy-efficient networks.
SWIPT is particularly attractive in low energy-demanding
scenarios to power battery-constrained wireless devices in
which replacing or even recharging the battery is generally
difficult. However, conventional wireless transceivers that are
optimal for information-only operation, may not be optimal
for SWIPT since information and energy receivers operate at
very different power sensitivity level [1]. Hence, a new set
of optimization schemes are needed in order to make SWIPT
practically appealing.
Since energy receivers (ERs) operate at significantly higher
power level compared to information receivers (IRs), it is
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generally assumed that the receivers located within the vicinity
of the transmitter are scheduled for energy harvesting (EH)
while those located relatively further are intended for infor-
mation transmission. Thus SWIPT becomes more viable in
fifth-generation (5G) and beyond communication systems in
which operators are expected to deploy a large number of
base stations (BSs) in a smaller area even at a distance of
tens of meters [2]. A key architectural design for 5G involves
heterogeneous networks (HetNets), in which the BSs and
the users are associated in multiple tiers with heterogeneous
cell coverage areas. An inherent detrimental element in such
network architectures is the co-tier and inter-tier interference.
In fact, the sky-high spectral efficiency and energy efficiency
envisaged in 5G communication networks vastly depends on
appropriate interference management schemes [2]. However,
as opposed to the conventional view of interference, we rec-
ognize that interference signals transport valuable energy to the
ERs struggling to continue their operation due to insufficient
power in stock. Thus ERs in future wireless networks may
have access to higher power levels for energy scavenging.
On the other hand, with access to stronger signals than the
IRs, malicious ERs may pose potential security threats to the
messages transmitted to the IRs. Thus developing appropriate
security measures for SWIPT is also crucial [3], [4]. This
motivates us to consider interference-aided security design for
SWIPT communications in this paper.
Recently, a new branch of research has opened the window
for data-aided beamforming for exploiting interference power
in the downlink transmission [5]–[11]. The basic concept
is to judiciously correlate interference signals among spatial
streams rather than the conventional approach of fully decorre-
lating them. This constructive interference (CI) is designed on
a per symbol basis and hence is modulation dependent. While
most of the existing works on constructive interference focus
on conventional downlink beamforming transmission [5]–[11],
CI has been effectively used for physical layer security in [12],
[13]. More recently, the authors of [14] and [15] considered
a two-cell relay network, where each cell has one uplink
and one downlink data traffic requirement. The proposed
interference alignment techniques in [14] align interference
away from the useful signals by designing various transmit
and receive schemes, whereas the schemes proposed in [16]
exploit the overheard signals from the adjacent cell to improve
the quality of signal reception in both cells. MMSE-based
multiuser precoders have been proposed in [17] for reducing
information leakage in a two-way relaying system. Note,
however, that the above works consider different scenarios,
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either multicell communication or relay links, whereas our
focus is on downlink transmission. More importantly, none
of the above works designs explicit optimization formulations
to exploit the interfering symbols and obtain a constructive
(destructive) overlap with the expected signal at the IRs (Eves).
Accordingly, these are distinct contributions to our work,
whereas in our proposed schemes, we exploit the knowledge
of data and CSI to develop more efficient secure precoding
techniques. On the other hand, interference-aided SWIPT has
been considered more recently in [18]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, none of the above approaches consid-
ered exploiting interference for simultaneous information and
power transmission, while securing the data from potential
eavesdroppers.
In this paper, we consider a multiple-input single-output
(MISO) downlink system where the transmitter aims at send-
ing secret messages to a set of IRs, as well as wireless energy
to a mutually exclusive group of ERs. Since the transmitter is
required to secure the privacy of the IRs’ messages, it needs to
secure the message signals against potential eavesdropping by
the ERs. Thus the ERs are legitimate users of the network for
energy scavenging only. Our aim is to exploit the knowledge
of multiuser interference (MUI) available at the transmitter as
well as artificially generated noise (AN) signals for improving
security in this SWIPT communication. Towards this end, we
adjust the phase of the MUI and redesign AN signals in the
form of constructive interference to the IRs while keeping
these interferences disruptive to potential eavesdropping by
the ERs. At the same time, the AN works as a vehicle for
transporting energy. We aim at minimizing the total transmit
power while guaranteeing the required SINR at the IRs as
well as degrading the ERs’ SINR below certain threshold. The
energy harvesting requirements at the ERs are also guaranteed
simultaneously. Note that the addition of security constraints
introduces significant new challenges in the optimisation prob-
lem, which we will demonstrate in Section IV. The proposed
constructive interference-based SWIPT precoding schemes
offer fourfold benefits compared to conventional AN-based
physical-layer security schemes considered in [19], [20] as
well as conventional secure SWIPT schemes designed in [3],
[4], [21]. Firstly, the constructive interference power greatly
contributes to the received SINR at the IRs as opposed to
the detrimental MUI in conventional interference management
schemes. Secondly, to achieve a predefined level of SINR
at the IRs, constructive interference based precoding scheme
requires lower power compared to conventional precoding
schemes thus reducing inter-user, inter-tier, and inter-cell in-
terferences. Thirdly, the surplus power can be easily injected
to the AN signal in order to boost the harvested energy at the
ERs. Finally, since the proposed schemes work on a symbol-
by-symbol basis, they can guarantee all the SINR, EH, and
secrecy constraints on an instantaneous basis, as opposed to
conventional secure SWIPT that can lead to instantaneous
signal or energy outages1.
Both perfect and imperfect channel state information (CSI)
cases have been investigated. The problem is non-convex in
1This is demonstrated through computer simulations in Section VIII.
both cases, with second-order constraints. Although the SINR
constraints considered in the power minimization problem can
be transformed into convex conic constraints in closed form,
the instantaneous (per symbol) EH constraints pose the biggest
challenge2 in exploiting interference for secure SWIPT. By
defining strong upper and lower bounds on the EH constraints,
we first propose second-order cone programming (SOCP)
based solutions for the perfect CSI case. In order to investigate
the tightness of the bounds, we then provide semidefinite
programming (SDP) based solutions for the problems as
benchmarks. Note that the SDP formulation has been proven
very efficient in solving many non-convex problems [22].
In addition, we also solve the worst-case harvested energy
maximization problem under the proposed bounds. Numerical
simulations demonstrate that the proposed constructive inter-
ference precoding approaches yield superior performance over
conventional schemes in terms of transmit power as well as
harvested energy. For clarity, the contributions in this paper
can be summarized as follows:
1) We first consider the case when CSI is perfectly known
and design a phase-shift keying (PSK) modulation based
secure precoding scheme such that the MUI and AN is
constructive to the IR thus reducing the required transit
power for given quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. In
order to tackle the non-convex energy harvesting con-
straints, we derive tight upper and lower bounds for the
power minimization problem. SDP based solutions have
also been derived for both upper and lower bounds.
2) Then, we derive a quadrature-amplitude modulation
(QAM) based secure precoding scheme for multi-level
modulations.
3) Finally, we design worst-case robust secure precoders for
SWIPT in the presence of imperfect CSI of all the nodes
for both PSK and QAM modulations.
In all cases, the proposed schemes outperform the conventional
AN-aided secure precoding schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model of a secret MISO downlink system for
SWIPT is introduced. The conventional SINR-constrained
power minimization problem is discussed in Section III for the
perfect CSI case whereas in Section IV, constructive AN-based
solutions to the same problem have been devised for secure
SWIPT. Next, we extend the analyses to QAM constellation
schemes in Section VI considering perfect CSI. Finally, in Sec-
tion VII, we develop robust constructive interference precoding
schemes for both PSK and QAM modulations. Section VIII
presents the simulation results that justify the significance of
the proposed algorithms under various scenarios. Concluding
remarks are provided in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO downlink system where the transmitter
(BS) equipped with NT transmit antennas intends to transmit
secret information to L IRs as well as wireless power to
K ERs. Note that the BS plays a hybrid role transmitting
2The exact technical challenge will be illustrated later in Section IV.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
















Fig. 1. System model for secure SWIPT with untrusted energy receivers.
both energy and information, as opposed to separate power
beacons and information transmitters for powering the energy
scavenging nodes considered in [23]. The IR and Eves are all
equipped with a single antenna3. We also assume that the IRs
are trustworthy for information reception, whereas the ERs
are trustworthy for energy harvesting only. It may happen
in practice, however, that some of the ERs are inquisitive
to the secret messages transmitted to the IRs and intend to
overhear the information signal. Thus, the BS needs to deploy
appropriate mechanisms to block potential eavesdropping by
the ERs. Hence in order to keep the ERs blind about the secret
messages, the BS injects AN signals into the transmit signal
in an attempt to reduce the received SINRs at the Eves. Thus
the received signal at the lth IR and that at the kth ER are
given, respectively, by yd,l and ye,k:
yd,l = h
T
d,lx+ nd,l, for l = 1, . . . , L, (1)
ye,k = h
T
e,kx+ ne,k, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where hd,l and he,k are the NT × 1 complex channel vectors
between the BS and the lth IR and between the BS and the kth
Eve, respectively, nd,l ∼ CN (0, σ2d) and ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2e )
are the additive Gaussian noises at the lth IR and the kth Eve,
respectively. The BS chooses the NT×1 transmit signal vector
x as the sum of information beamforming vectors bd,lsd,l, l =
1, . . . , L, and the NT× 1 AN vector z such that the baseband




bd,lsd,l + z, (3)
where sd,l = ejφd,l ∼ CN (0, 1) is the unit-amplitude confi-
dential information-bearing symbol for the lth IR.
3Since our intention is to present the proposed constructive interference
based secure precoding schemes to the readers in an easy-to-access manner,
we restrict our analysis to the MISO eavesdropping scenario. However, for the
general MIMO eavesdropping case, the generalization is straightforward by
replacing the vector channels with matrices. As such, one needs to concatenate
the channel matrices into vectors and do minor modifications in the required
transformations to formulate the proposed SOCP solutions.





∣∣∣hTd,lbd,m∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣hTd,lz∣∣∣2 + σ2d , (4)








∣∣∣hTe,kbd,m∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣hTe,kz∣∣∣2 + σ2e ,∀l,∀k. (5)
On the other hand, the average harvested power (i.e., harvested
energy per unit time) at the kth ER can be expressed as




∣∣hTe,kbd,l∣∣2 + ∣∣hTe,kz∣∣2 + σ2e
)
, (6)
where ξ is the conversion efficiency of the energy transducers
from RF domain to electrical domain.
III. CONVENTIONAL AVERAGE POWER MINIMIZATION
In this section, we assume that perfect CSI of all nodes
is available at the transmitter. This is practicable in the
considered system model since both the IRs and the ERs are
legitimate users of the system for different services namely
information and energy, respectively. We consider a power
minimization problem for secure transmission of information
to the IRs under QoS constraints at the IRs as well as secrecy
constraints at the untrusted ERs (with respect to information)
while sustaining their energy harvesting requirements [4]. In
order to satisfy these requirements, the conventional power





















∣∣hTe,kbd,l∣∣2 + ∣∣hTe,kz∣∣2 + σ2e
)
≥ ηk,∀k, (7d)
where γd is the minimum SINR requirement for correct
detection at the IRs and γe is the secrecy threshold for
the ERs interception, whereas ηk is the energy harvesting
threshold at the kth ER. The power minimization problem (7)
is non-convex and has been solved considering various system
configurations [3], [4]. We consider the schemes proposed in
[3], [4] as the benchmark schemes. One conventional approach
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is to reformulate problem (7) as an SDP and optimize the
transmit covariance matrices for information and AN signals.
However, this results in inherent rank constraints on the infor-
mation covariance matrices. Conventionally, the non-convex
rank constraints are dropped so that the relaxed problem can
be solved using existing SDP solvers [24]. Interestingly, it has
been proven in [3], [4] that for a wide range of practically
representative scenarios, the original problem can be solved
optimally satisfying the rank constraints. Interested readers
are referred to [3], [4] for further details on the technique.
Although the solutions proposed in [3], [4] are optimal from
a stochastic viewpoint, the hidden power in the AN signals
has been treated as detrimental for the desired information
at the IRs, and hence, either nullified or suppressed. In the
following section, we endeavour to develop precoding schemes
exploiting the MUI and AN power constructively for the
desired signal at the IRs.
Fig. 2. Constructive interference design for IR with 8-PSK modulation.
The decision thresholds are represented by the red dashed lines and the
constructive regions are denoted by the green shaded areas. The constructive
interference signals move the received symbols at the IR (y˜d,l) away from
the decision thresholds of the constellation towards the constructive region
of the constellation point of interest. In contrast, the AN signals destructive
to the eavesdroppers push the eavesdroppers’ received signals away from the
constellation point of interest.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE AN-BASED INSTANTANEOUS POWER
MINIMIZATION
By exploiting MUI on a symbol-by-symbol basis, it has
been shown in [8], [9] that the MUI power can significantly
contribute towards the received SINR at the desired receiver.
The theory and characterization criteria for this constructive
interference have been extensively studied in [5]–[9], [25]. To
avoid repetition, we refer the reader to the above works for the
details, while here we employ this concept directly to design
our secure beamforming problems for SWIPT.
Constructive IR Constraints: As in many conventional
beamforming schemes, we assume in this section that full
CSI of all nodes is available at the transmitter4. We aim
at exploiting the available knowledge of MUI as well as
AN to boost the received SINR at the IR in an attempt
to reduce the required transmit power, while guaranteeing
the secrecy and EH constraints for the ERs. We restrict our
analysis in this section to M -PSK modulation, while extension
to other modulation schemes (e.g., M -QAM) is relegated
until Section VI. Now, the MUI and AN signals will be
constructive to the received signal at the IR if they move the
received symbols away from the decision thresholds of the
constellation. These are represented by the red dashed lines
in Fig. 2 for the example of 8-PSK constellation. This can be
effectively done by pushing the decision symbols towards the
constructive regions of the modulation constellation, denoted
by the green shaded areas in Fig. 2. Hence we intend to keep
the angle of the received signal aligned with the angle of the
corresponding desired symbol sd,l by appropriately designing
the transmit and AN beamforming vectors5.
In order to align the transmit symbols along the direction
of the lth IR’s modulated symbol sd,l, we can subtract the
phase of sd,l from the phase of the corresponding information-






j(φd,m−φd,l)sd,l + ze−jφd,lsd,l. (8)
Although in (8), the transmit symbol has been aligned with the
l-th IR, in general, any of the user’s signal can be chosen as
the reference signal. Assuming constant envelop transmission,






















Note that in (8) - (10), any of the IRs’ symbols can be taken
as the reference (l) without loss of generality.
For constructive precoding, the MUI and AN signals re-
ceived at the IRs are not suppressed or nullified in contrast
to their conventional use (cf. Section III), rather optimized
instantaneously such that they contribute to the received signal
power. Following the constructive interference characterization
criteria derived in [8], [9], it can be shown that the received
SINR (4) at the lth IR can be rewritten as
Γd,l =
∣∣∣hTd,l (∑Lm=1 bd,msd,m + z)∣∣∣2
σ2d
. (11)
4Secure beamforming design with imperfect CSI will be studied in Sec-
tion VII.
5Although we selected 8-PSK as a representative modulation scheme for
exposition in Fig. 2, the proposed algorithms are readily applicable to any
PSK modulation scheme. Indeed, all formulations shown are applicable to
any order PSK modulation, parametric to the angle θ.
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Clearly, it is evident from (11) that the MUI as well as the
AN are now contributing to the desired signal power. Thus the
received SINR at the IR has effectively turned to SNR after
applying constructive precoding. However, the SINR at the kth
ER remains the same as in (5) since no interference/AN signal
has been made constructive to the ERs.
Now, our target is to design the signal and AN beam-
forming vectors such that the constructive SINR (11) be-







signal ignoring the AWGN at the lth IR, and αR,l and αI,l as
the abscissa and the ordinate of the phase-adjusted signal y˜d,l,
respectively. Applying basic geometric principles to Fig. 2,
it can be observed that the interference contaminated received
signal y˜d,l lays on the constructive zone of the desired symbol
sd,l as long as the following condition is satisfied
−θ ≤ φd,l ≤ θ, i.e., |αI,l|
αR,l − γ˜d ≤ tan θ, (12)
where θ = pi/M , M is the constellation size and γ˜d , σd
√
Γd.





















−σd,l√γd] tan θ, (13)
where <{x} and ={x} indicate the real and imaginary parts
of the complex number x, respectively.
Note that the phases of the MUI and the AN signals in
(13) have been shifted by the phase of the desired symbol
sd,l. We note that this signal alignment will only hold for the
structure of the lth IR’s channel hd,l, while there will be no
such alignment for the ERs’ channels he,k, k = 1, · · · ,K,
which are assumed statistically independent.
Destructive Eavesdropping Constraints: Now, we deal with
the instantaneous eavesdropping constraint. The aim is to
design the signal and AN beamformers such that the MUI and
AN signals are as disruptive as possible to the ERs’ detection
while satisfying their instantaneous EH constraints. As long as
the ERs’ channel knowledge is available at the transmitter, one
can do so by pushing the received signals at the ERs away from
the decision thresholds (towards the corresponding red zone
in Fig. 2, i.e., |φe,k| ≥ θ). This makes correct detection more
challenging for the ERs by reducing the received SINR. The
benefit is that the given secrecy constraints can be guaranteed
on a symbol-by-symbol basis, rather than the conventional
statistical guarantees [3], [4], which are prone to instantaneous
outages6.
Thus the SINR restriction constraints at the ERs can be
represented by the following system of inequalities










































−σe√γe) tan θ,∀k. (14b)
Thus exploiting the knowledge of the interfering signals (MUI
and AN in this case), the constructive precoding design










































where η¯k , ηk/ξ,∀k.
For notational simplicity, let us now define NT × 1 vec-




j(φd,m−φd,1) + ze−jφd,1 . Then the problem
(15) can be represented as the following instantaneous secrecy


































(16d)∥∥∥h˜Te,kw∥∥∥2 ≥ η¯k,∀k. (16e)
Note that the problem (16) forms a virtual multicasting se-
crecy optimization problem for SWIPT with only one vector
variable w to be optimized. Apparently, problem (16) looks
simpler. However, the problem is in fact nonconvex due to
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the EH constraint (16e) and the solution to this problem is
not tractable. The main challenge arises from the fact that
the instantaneous EH constraint (16e) cannot be convexi-
fied using standard optimization techniques in closed form.
In conventional optimization schemes for SWIPT, the EH
constraint is generally transformed to a trace (of a matrix)
constraint, which is convex [3], [4], [21]. However, this cannot
be straightforwardly applied to the data-aided instantaneous
EH constraint (16e). Hence in the following, we endeavour to
develop SOCP based approximate solutions for problem (16)
by defining appropriate bounds.
A. SOCP Upper Bound Solution
In order to obtain an upper bounding solution to problem
(16) we need to approximate the non-convex constraint (16e)














tan θ ≥ 0, ∀k. (17)























it is true that whenever (18) holds, inequality (17) holds as
well since σe
√
γe is nonnegative. Combining inequality (18)
with



























Note that (20) is a stricter constraint compared to (16e). Thus
replacing (16e) by (20) will provide an upper bound solution
for problem (16). Although (20) is still non-convex, it can be
transformed into a convex constraint by defining two positive
















Constraint (23) is a restricted hyperbolic constraint of the form
yz ≥ x2 y, z ≥ 0, with y = r1,k, z = r2,k and x = √η¯k,
which is equivalent to the convex rotated second-order cone
(SOC) constraint [22]∥∥∥∥[ 2xy − z
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ y + z. (24)
By transforming the EH constraint (23) into a rotated SOC













































tan θ,∀k, (25f)∥∥∥∥[ 2√η¯kr1,k − r2,k
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ r1,k + r2,k,∀k, (25g)
r1,k ≥ 0, r2,k ≥ 0,∀k. (25h)
Note that problem (25) is now convex and can be optimally
solved using existing SOCP solvers [24]. In addition, notice
that constraints (16c) and (16e) has been replaced by (25c)
and (25e) - (25h), which always satisfy the original constraints
according to (18) and (19), respectively. Hence, the optimal
solution of (25) provides an upper bound to the original
problem.
B. SOCP Lower Bound Solution
In order to obtain a lower bound solution to problem (16),
we bound the non-convex constraint (16e) from below. This
can be achieved by relaxing the energy harvesting constraint
(16e). Now, inequalities (16c) and (16d), respectively, state
that
={h˜Te,kw} ≥ (<{h˜Te,kw} − σe
√
γe) tan θ, (26)
−={h˜Te,kw} ≤ (<{h˜Te,kw} − σe
√
γe) tan θ. (27)
Hence, it is true that ={h˜Te,kw} ≥ 0, and we have
σe
√




Combining the fact that <{h˜Te,kw} ≤ ={h˜Te,kw}/ tan θ +
σe
√
γe with (16e) yields
(={h˜Te,kw}/ tan θ + σe
√
γe)












− η¯ ≥ 0. (30)
Essentially, due to inequality (28), it is true that
(={h˜Te,kw}/ tan θ+ σe
√
γe)
2 +={h˜Te,kw}2 ≥ <{h˜Te,kw}2
+ ={h˜Te,kw}2. (31)
Note that (31) is a second-order inequality, which is solvable
when the discriminant is non-negative. This observation leads
to the following condition:
∆k = 4η¯k(1 +
1
tan2 θ
)− 4σ2eγe ≥ 0. (32)
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Under condition (32) and given the fact that ={h˜Te,kw} ≥ 0,
inequality (30) can be simplified to
={h˜Te,kw} ≥
−σe√γe/ tan θ +
√
η¯k(1 + 1/ tan
2 θ)− σ2eγe
1 + 1/ tan2 θ
.
(33)
Note that it is possible that condition (33) is bounded from
below. Thus condition (33) can be used as a lower bound
instead of the inequality (16e). Accordingly, the lower bound




s.t. Constraints (16b), (16c), (16d), (34b)
constraint (33) whenever ∆k ≥ 0, (34c)
which is a linear programming problem. Problem (34) can be
optimally solved using existing convex optimization toolboxes
[24].
V. SDP-BASED SOLUTIONS
Any SOCP constraint of the form x2 ≤ yx, y, z ≥ 0 can be
transformed into an SDP constraint according to the following
lemma [22]:






We apply this lemma in order to derive corresponding SDP
solutions for the problems (25) and (34).
A. SDP Upper Bound Solution
In this subsection, we provide the SDP upper bound solution
of (25) for completeness. In the SDP formulation, we do not
need to define any slack variable, e.g., r1,k r2,k. Thus we















 0,∀k, ∀l. (36c)
B. SDP Lower Bound Solution
While the SDP upper bound formulation (36) provides
some alternative solution to the original problem, SDP lower
bound solution has some interesting practical significance. In
particular, we do not need to relax the EH constraint in the
SDP lower bound formulation. In order to derive the SDP
lower bound solution of (16), we denote NT × NT matrix
W , wwH . However, this is a strict equality constraint,
which requires the matrix W be of rank one. As discussed
in Section III, the rank constraint on W is nonconvex. In
order to get around it, we replace the strict equality constraint
by the inequality constraint W  wwH . Thus we obtain the





















SDP problems (36) and (37) can be solved efficiently using
CVX [24]. Note that a rank-one W always solves problem
(37) optimally.
Remark 1: Note that depending on the system parameters,
i.e., K, L, and NT , SOCP may have higher complexity than
SDP and vice versa. The complexity order of the conventional
solution (Section III) and the proposed SOCP and SDP so-
lutions are given in Table I based on interior-point method
based solvers [24]. In this context, we would like to emphasize
that the SOCP in (25) and the SDP in (36) actually have
identical computational complexity. However, we note some
performance gain in terms of transmit power (see Fig. 4) from
the SDP solution as compared with the corresponding SOCP
solution. Similar behaviour has also been observed in [18].
However, such a gain is not obvious (see Fig. 9). This actually
motivated us to study both schemes for the non-convex secrecy
power minimization problem in the interest of completeness
for interested readers. The network designer may choose the
appropriate solution depending on the available resources.
TABLE I





KL+K + L+ (L+ 1)N2T[nc(nc + 1)
×(KL+K + L) + n3c , nc = O((L+ 1)N2T)
Problem (25) ln(1/)
√
(6K + L+ 3)n1[(n1 + 1)(6K + L) + 9K
+n1], n1 = O(NT)
Problem (34) ln(1/)
√




(6K + L+ 3)n3[(n3 + 1)(6K + L) + 9K




(K + 1)(NT + 1) + 2Kn4[(K + 1)(NT
+1)2(NT + n4 + 1) + 4K + n
2
4],
n4 = O(N2T +NT)
VI. CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE PRECODING FOR
QAM MODULATION
As mentioned earlier, constructive interference precoding is
modulation-specific. In the previous two sections, we designed
secure precoding schemes for M -PSK modulation. In this
section, we focus on secure constructive interference precod-
ing for the M -QAM scheme. Fig. 3 depicts the conceptual
framework of 16-QAM constellation based on binary mapping.
Constructive precoding for QAM has been studied in [26]
for information transmission only. Although it is notationally
difficult to generalize to generic QAM [26], [27], we note that
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Fig. 3. Constructive framework of 16-QAM constellation based on binary
mapping. The number in each box indicates the binary-coded decimal equiv-
alent. The fading colors in the outer boxes indicate the open constructive
regions while the solid color in the inner boxes indicate closed regions.
the proposed idea can be readily extended to arbitrary modu-
lations [9]. However, defining secure regions in the presence
of potential eavesdroppers based on destructive interference
is significantly challenging and is still unexplored. In the
following, we discuss interference exploitation schemes based
on 16-QAM for downlink secure SWIPT systems. For ease
of exposition, we divide different constellation points into
different color zones in Fig. 3.
Note that the transmit symbols mapped within the ‘red’ zone
are surrounded by the decision boundaries and hence there is
no margin for constructive precoding for transmitting these
symbols to the IRs. The IRs’ SINR constraints should guaran-
tee the exact constellation points subject to γd. However, the
destructive regions for the ERs are still exploitable. Thus for















γd={sd,l}, for l = 1, . . . , L, (39)
C3:
∣∣∣<{h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≥ σe√γe<{sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (40)
C4:
∣∣∣={h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≥ σe√γe={sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K. (41)
For transmit symbols within the ‘yellow’ zone ‘4−8−7−11’,
the constructive SINR constraints should aim at pushing the
quadrature amplitude at the IRs away from the decision
thresholds. However, the in-phase amplitude should match
that of the exact constellation points. We keep the quadrature
amplitude of the ERs’ received signals open along the reverse








γd<{sd,l}, for l = 1, . . . , L, (42)
C2:
∣∣∣={h˜Td,lw}∣∣∣ ≥ σd√γd={sd,l}, for l = 1, . . . , L, (43)
C3:
∣∣∣<{h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≥ σe√γe<{sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (44)
C4:
∣∣∣={h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≤ σe√γe={sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K. (45)
In a similar fashion, we define the constructive zone for
transmit symbols within the ‘yellow’ zone ‘1− 2− 13− 14’,
and define the secrecy SINR constraints as
C1:







γd={sd,l}, for l = 1, . . . , L, (47)
C3:
∣∣∣<{h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≤ σe√γe<{sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (48)
C4:
∣∣∣={h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≥ σe√γe={sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K. (49)
For transmit symbols within the ‘green’ zones, we have the
widest constructive precoding zones, and note that these are
identical to the QPSK case. Following the concept discussed
in Section IV for M -PSK modulation, we define the secrecy
SINR constraints as
C1:
∣∣∣<{h˜Td,lw}∣∣∣ ≥ σd√γd<{sd,l}, for l = 1, . . . , L, (50)
C2:
∣∣∣={h˜Td,lw}∣∣∣ ≥ σd√γd={sd,l}, for l = 1, . . . , L, (51)
C3:
∣∣∣<{h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≤ σe√γe<{sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (52)
C4:
∣∣∣={h˜Te,kw}∣∣∣ ≤ σe√γe={sd,l}, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (53)
Finally, the energy harvesting constraint for QAM constella-
tions can be bounded following similar approach as for the
PSK modulation. Thus, the constructive interference-aided up-



















,∀k, (54d)∥∥∥∥[ 2√η¯kr1,k − r2,k
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ r1,k + r2,k,∀k, (54e)
r1,k ≥ 0, r2,k ≥ 0,∀k. (54f)
Similarly, a lower bound solution can be derived for the 16-
QAM scheme. However, we omit the detailed derivation of
the lower bound solution for brevity.
VII. ROBUST CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE PRECODING
In the previous sections, we considered constructive inter-
ference based secure beamforming design for SWIPT with
perfect CSI of all nodes available at the transmitter. However,
that is a limiting assumption for many practical wireless
communication systems. Although channel training is possible
in the considered scenario with all the users being actively
served with different services, the estimated CSI is often not
perfect for various reasons. Hence in this section, we study
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robust CI beamforming design for scenarios when the available
CSI is imperfect.
We model the imperfect CSI considering the widely used
Gaussian channel error model such that the channel error
vectors have circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
distribution with norm-bounded errors. Thus, the actual chan-
nels between the BS and the lth IR can be modeled as
hd,l = hˆd,l + ed,l,∀l, (55)
and that between the BS and the kth ER can be modelled as
he,k = hˆe,k + ee,k,∀k, (56)
where hˆd,l,∀l, and hˆe,k,∀k, denote the NT× 1 imperfect es-
timated CSI available at the BS and ed,l ∈ CNT×1,∀l, ee,k ∈
CNT×1,∀k, represent the channel uncertainties such that
‖ed,l‖2 ≤ ε2d,∀l, and ‖ee,k‖2 ≤ ε2e ,∀k, respectively.
A. Conventional AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
The conventional AN-aided downlink robust secrecy power

























∣∣hTe,kbd,l∣∣2 + ∣∣hTe,kz∣∣2 + σ2e ≥ η¯k,∀k.(57d)
Due to the spherical channel uncertainty model, constraints
(57b) and (57c) actually involve infinitely many constraints
which makes the problem (57) very difficult to solve. However,
the inequality constraints in (57) can be transformed into
convex linear matrix inequality (LMI) constraints by applying
the S-procedure [4, Lemma 2], and thus problem (57) can
be readily solved using existing solvers. It has been proved in
[21] that whenever problem (57) is feasible, the corresponding
transmit precoding solution is of rank one hence optimal.
B. Constructive Interference Aided Robust Secure Precoding
In this section, we aim at constructive interference based
robust secure precoding design with imperfect knowledge of
all CSI, as opposed to its perfect CSI counterpart in Section IV.
With the deterministic channel uncertainty model described
above, we consider worst-case based robust design. Based on
the problem formulation in (16) for the perfect CSI case, the

















































tan θ, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe,∀k, (58d)∥∥∥∥(hˆe,k + ee,k)T w∥∥∥∥ ≥ η¯k, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe,∀k. (58e)
Considering the real and imaginary parts of each complex
vector separately, we have
h˜d,l = hˆR,d,l + jhˆI,d,l + eR,d,l + jeI,d,l,∀l, (59)
w = wR + jwI , (60)
where the subscripts R and I indicate the real and imaginary
components of the corresponding complex notation, respec-







= hˆTR,d,lwR − hˆTI,d,lwI + eTR,d,lwR − eTI,d,lwI




















. Similarly, the imaginary component























. Thus the constraint (58b) can be














γd tan θ ≤ 0 (63)
max
‖ed,l‖≤εd









γd tan θ ≤ 0. (64)



























γe tan θ ≥ 0, (66)
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. On the other hand, consid-
ering the fact that
∥∥∥h˜Te,kw∥∥∥2 = <{h˜Te,kw}2 + ={h˜Te,kw}2,
the energy harvesting constraints (58e) can be expressed as
e¯Te,k (W1 +W2) e¯e,k + 2e¯
T
e,k (W1 +W2) h¯e,k
+ h¯Te,k (W1 +W2) h¯e,k ≥ η¯k,∀k, ‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe,∀k, (67)
where W1 , w1wT1 and W2 , w2wT2 . Applying S-
procedure [22], the constraint (67) can be expressed as the
following LMI:[
µe,kINT +W1 +W2 (W1 +W2) h¯e,k




Here, µe,k, k = 1, · · · ,K, are the associated slack variables
and κe,k , h¯Te,k (W1 +W2) h¯e,k − η¯k − µe,kε2e .
By replacing the CSI error bounds in these constraints, the








− h¯Td,lw2 − h¯Td,lw1 tan θ + εd ‖w2 +w1 tan θ‖
+ σd
√
γd ≤ 0, (69c)
− h¯Te,kw2 − h¯Te,kw1 tan θ − εe ‖w2 +w1‖ tan θ
+ σe
√
γe ≤ 0 (69d)
h¯Te,kw2 + h¯
T














rank (W1) = 1, rank (W2) = 1. (69h)
Now, the problem (69) can be efficiently solved after rank-
relaxation using existing solvers [24]. The solution is optimal
if rank(W1) = 1 and rank(W2) = 1, in which case it holds
true that W1 = w1 ∗ wT1 and W2 = w2 ∗ wT2 . Otherwise,
one may need to resort to an alternative approach, for example
randomization, to construct rank-one W1 and W2. Interested
readers are referred to [28], [29] for different rank-one solution
construction procedures.
C. Robust Power Minimization for QAM Constellation
In this subsection, we study the robust counterpart of the
16-QAM scheme developed in Section VI. The constructive
interference-aided upper bound power minimization problem

























Constraints (68), (69g) satisfied, (70f)
rank (W1) = 1, rank (W2) = 1. (70g)
where S suggests the appropriate direction of the inequalities
based on the transmit symbol mapping shown in the constel-
lation diagram in Fig. 3 and in the explicit expressions in
(38) - (53). Substituting the error bounds, the problem (70)
is solvable using off-the-shelf convex optimization toolboxes
after rank-relaxation.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical simulation results
to evaluate the performance of the proposed constructive
interference based PLS algorithms for wireless data and energy
integrated communications in a MISO wiretap channel. Unless
otherwise specified, QPSK and 16-QAM are the modulation
schemes considered. All the estimated channel vectors are
generated as independent and identically distributed complex
Gaussian random variables with mean zero and the TGn
path-loss model for urban cellular environment is adopted
considering a path-loss exponent of 2.7 [30]. Noise power level
is set to σd = σe = 1 in all simulations. All simulation results
are averaged over 2000 independent channel realizations,
unless explicitly mentioned. In the following simulations, we
compare the performance of the proposed approaches with that
of the conventional AN-aided precoding scheme in [31] as the
benchmark. The legends in the figures are defined in Table II.
TABLE II
LIST OF ALGORITHMS COMPARED
Legend Algorithm
No Eve CSI (conv) Conventional isotropic beamforming without eaves-
dropper’s CSI proposed in [19].
No Eve CSI (cons) Constructive isotropic beamforming without eaves-
dropper’s CSI, i.e., problem (16a)-(16b) ignoring the
remaining constraints.
Full CSI (conv) Conventional AN-aided secure beamforming scheme
discussed in Section III [3].
Cons UB Constructive AN-aided upper bound solution devel-
oped in Section IV-A.
Cons UB Constructive AN-aided lower bound solution devel-
oped in Section IV-B.
SDP UB SDP formulation of the constructive AN-aided upper
bound solution derived in Section V-A.
SDP LB SDP formulation of the constructive AN-aided lower
bound solution derived in Section V-B.
16-QAM Constructive AN-aided multi-level modulation for 16-
QAM upper bound solution derived in Section VI.
Conv Rob Prec Conventional robust secure beamforming scheme for
SWIPT [21, Problem (16)].
Const Rob Prec CI-based robust precoding derived in Section VII-B.
We first demonstrate the performance of the non-robust
algorithms with perfect CSI. Fig. 4 shows the average instan-
taneous transmit power for the algorithms versus the SINR
threshold at the IRs with NT = 8, L = 2,K = 4, Γe = −10
(dB), and η = −5 (dBW). It can be seen from Fig. 4
that the constructive interference based schemes significantly
outperform the conventional beamforming schemes in terms
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Fig. 4. Transmit power PT versus required SINR at IR Γd with NT =
8, L = 2,K = 4, Γe = −10 (dB), and η = −5 (dBW).
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Fig. 5. Average time complexity per optimization versus the number of
eavesdroppers K with NT = 8, L = 2, Γd = 15 (dB), Γe = −10 (dB), and
η = −5 (dBW).
of transmit power. In particular, the proposed schemes for
QPSK modulation require down to 60% of power compared
to the conventional counterpart (plotted with pentagon point
marker). For example, the proposed schemes yield almost
10dB gain for QPSK modulation at 20dB SINR target. The
respective gains still persists for 16-QAM at 12 dB SINR. In
addition, while the target SINR increases, the gap between
the conventional and the proposed schemes keeps increasing,
indicating even better performance at higher SINR targets.
Another important observation is that the performance gap
between the proposed upper and lower bound schemes are
really small, which indicates that the proposed bounds are
indeed tight. On the other hand, the ‘No Eve CSI’ schemes
require significantly higher power, which is vastly dependent
on the total transmit power budget. Interestingly, even without
imposing the eavesdropping constraints explicitly, the con-
structive interference based ‘No Eve CSI’ scheme outperforms







































Signal power (Cons UB)
AN power (Cons UB)
Fig. 6. Instantaneous power allocation between information and AN signals
versus required SINR at IR Γd with NT = 8, L = 2,K = 5, 7, Γe = −10
(dB), and η = −5 (dBW).
Note that in Fig. 4, we have compared the transmit power
requirements of the proposed constructive interference based
schemes with that of the relevant conventional schemes in
[3] and [4]. For the conventional schemes, we plot average
expected transmit power while for the proposed schemes,
we plot the average instantaneous transmit power. However,
the conventional schemes are normally performed per each
transmission frame while the proposed schemes are performed
for every symbol period. Now, in order to provide a fairer
comparison, we show the average time complexity of the
algorithms per optimization. In Fig. 5, we show the average
execution time of the proposed constructive interference based
schemes as well as the conventional scheme in [3], [4]. The
results in Fig. 5 are produced in an iMac with a 4.2 GHz
Intel Core i7 processor and 64 GB 2400 MHz DDR4 RAM
running on MacOS High Sierra version 10.13.4. We solved the
optimization problems using the Matlab based solver CVX
[24]. Clearly, the average execution time of the proposed
SOCP schemes is comparable to that of the conventional
schemes. Note that the average execution time of the SDP
schemes is relatively higher due to the additional constraints
replacing the energy harvesting constraint.
Overall, our proposed approaches require a higher symbol-
by-symbol optimization complexity, and this is shared with all
interference exploitation approaches compared to conventional
schemes [7]–[9], [11]–[13]. We note however, that this com-
plexity involves the BS in the downlink transmission, where
computational resources are far more accessible, and in fact, it
was shown in [32] that there are significant complexity savings
at the MU receivers. Clearly, this complexity increase at the
BS is well motivated by the significant performance gains from
the interference exploitation approach.
In the next couple of examples, we will have a closer look
into the transmit power distribution between the information
and the AN signals to get more insights. Fig. 6 shows the
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instantaneous power allocation between information (‖bd‖2)
and AN signals (‖z‖2) versus required SINR at IR Γd with
NT = 8, L = 2,K = 5, 7, Γe = −10 (dB), and η = −5
(dBW), whereas Fig. 7 depicts the same versus eavesdropping
constraints at the ERs Γe with NT = 8, L = 3,K = 5,
Γd = 20 (dB), η = −5 (dBW), and QPSK modulation. In
both cases, one can notice that the power allocated to AN in
the conventional scheme is significantly higher compared to
that in the constructive interference schemes. This observation
demonstrates the effectiveness of constructive interference
schemes. As derived in (11), it is the constructive interfer-
ence/AN power that allows guaranteeing the SINR require-
ments at the legitimate receivers at lower transmit power. Note
that the gap between the signal and the AN power in the
conventional scheme reduces for an increased number of users
(e.g., K = 7), as also observed in [31]. However, an interesting
observation is that the constructive interference schemes split
the transmit power almost equally between information and
AN beams. From Fig. 7, it can also be revealed that with
relaxed eavesdropping constraints (increasing Γe), less power
is invested on AN in the conventional scheme to block weaker
eavesdropping attempts. On the other hand, power splitting
remains the same in constructive interference schemes even
with relaxed eavesdropping constraints.
























Signal power (Cons UB)
AN power (Cons UB)
Fig. 7. Instantaneous power allocation between information and AN signals
versus required SINR at ER Γe with NT = 8, L = 3,K = 5, Γd = 20
(dB), and η = −5 (dBW).
Now we are interested in observing the transmit power
requirements of the algorithms with increasing number of
potential eavesdroppers. Note that in our system model, eaves-
dropping attempts are exposed by the legitimate ERs. Hence,
an increase in the number of eavesdropping ERs emphatically
increases the number of energy harvesting and secrecy con-
straints. Fig. 8 plots the transmit power of the various designs,
as well as the power allocation between information and AN
signals versus the number of ERs with NT = 8, L = 2,
Γd = 20 (dB), Γe = −10 (dB), η = −5 (dBW), and QPSK
modulation. Again, the proposed schemes exhibit superior
performance. It is no surprise to observe that with increasing
K, the transmit power of all the algorithms keeps increasing,





















































Fig. 8. Transmit power PT versus the number of eavesdroppers with NT =
8, L = 2, Γd = 20 (dB), Γe = −10 (dB), and η = −5 (dBW).
since increasing number of ER means more eavesdropping
threats.
































Fig. 9. Transmit power PT versus energy harvesting threshold at the ERs η
with NT = 8, L = 3,K = 5, Γd = 15 (dB), and Γe = −10 (dB).
Let us now focus on the energy harvesting performance of
the proposed algorithms as compared with the conventional
schemes proposed in [33]. In Fig. 9, we plot the instantaneous
transmit powers for the algorithms versus the energy harvest-
ing threshold at the ERs averaged over channel realizations.
This time we set NT = 8, L = 3,K = 5, Γd = 15 (dB), and
Γe = −10 (dB). It can be observed from the results in Fig. 9
that the required transmit power in the conventional and the
16-QAM schemes is almost invariant at low EH requirements
although it sharply increases after 10 dBW. This happens
because the SINR thresholds requirements overshadow the
EH requirements at low EH threshold for these two schemes.
On the other hand, the proposed upper and lower bound
schemes exhibit a gradual increase in transmit power for QPSK
modulation with increasing EH requirements.
Next, we demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed con-
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Fig. 10. Normalized histogram of the average IR SINR with NT = 8, L =
3,K = 5, Γd = 10 (dB), Γe = −5 (dB), and η = 15 (dBW).
structive interference based secure beamforming schemes by
examining their achievable instantaneous received SINR at
the IRs. Fig. 10 shows the histograms of the achievable
SINRs normalized by the thresholds on per symbol basis
with NT = 8, L = 3,K = 5, Γd = 10 (dB), Γe = −5
(dB), and η = 15 (dBW). It can be observed from this
figure that although the conventional SINR constraint (7b)
guarantees the average IR SINR requirement, the same may
not be guaranteed for every symbol period. As indicated by
the histograms of the conventional schemes, the achievable
received SINR has a Gaussian distribution and almost in 50%
of the cases the SINR requirement may not be satisfied on
an instantaneous basis. Indeed, this may potentially result in
outages for the respective users. In contrast, the proposed
constructive interference based schemes always guarantee the
SINR requirements. Thus the proposed schemes are great
candidates for systems with stringent SINR requirements.






































Fig. 11. Normalized histogram of harvested power at the ERs with NT =
8, L = 3,K = 5, Γd = 10 (dB), Γe = −5 (dB), and η = 15 (dBW).


























                Conv Rob Prec
                Const Rob Prec
Fig. 12. Transmit power PT versus the radius of the channel uncertainty
region of the legitimate IRs εd with NT = 8, L = 3, Γd = 15 (dB),
Γe = −10 (dB), η = −5 (dBW), and εe = 0.1 for robust beamforming
design.
A similar observation can be drawn by the histogram of the
instantaneous harvested power normalized by the thresholds
at the ERs in Fig. 11 with NT = 8, L = 3,K = 5, Γd = 10
(dB), Γe = −5 (dB), η = 15 (dBW), and QPSK modulation.
Similar to the legitimate ERs’ SINR case (Fig. 10), the
conventional average EH constraint based approach violates
the instantaneous EH constraints in many cases. On the other
hand, the proposed constructive interference based schemes
guarantee each constraint for every symbol period.
Finally, we investigate the performance of the proposed
robust algorithms with imperfect CSI available at the trans-
mitter. Fig. 12 illustrates the average instantaneous transmit
power versus the radius of the channel uncertainty region of
the legitimate IRs εd with NT = 8, L = 3, Γd = 15 (dB),
Γe = −10 (dB), η = −5 (dBW), and εe = 0.1 for robust
beamforming design. Results in Fig. 12 demonstrate that even
with imperfect CSI the proposed constructive interference
schemes outperform conventional schemes. While the relative
comparison of transmit power for the conventional and the
proposed constructive interference schemes follows a similar
pattern as observed in the perfect CSI case, an increase in the
uncertainty in channel estimation results in higher transmit
power for both schemes in order to guarantee the same QoS
level. This is obvious since increased channel uncertainty
region effectively means more inaccurate channel information.
Also, securing information against increased number of eaves-
droppers demands additional transmit power.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed interference exploitation approaches for AN-
aided secure beamforming in simultaneous information and
energy transfer systems. We studied the downlink transmit
power minimization problem under secrecy SINR and energy
harvesting constraints considering both perfect and imperfect
CSI at the BS. In the proposed schemes, multiuser interference
as well as AN are designed to be constructive to the IRs and
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disruptive to the potential eavesdropping ERs. Additionally,
the AN is exploited as a vehicle for energy transfer. Thus the
AN plays a triple role in the proposed schemes in contrast
to its double role in conventional SWIPT systems. Simulation
results demonstrated that the proposed schemes significantly
reduce transmit power by proactively exploiting interference
and AN power.
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